Over the last 20+ years, Thom Brooks’s work has contributed the following concepts, definitions and issues:
UNDER CONSTRUCTION
A
Amoral crimes, problem of. Refers to issue of how crimes are justified as crimes. If not all crimes are unlawful because they are immoral or even evil (such as when – as mala prohibita – the crimes are crimes because they are prohibited), then punishment cannot only be justified as a response to immorality if it is to apply to these kinds of crimes. Instead, it must account for illegality first and foremost. (See Brooks, Punishment 2d, 24-25).
Ascertaining criminal intentions, problem of. Refers to the challenge of discerning moral responsibility with sufficient certainty for theories, such as retribution, that might require it. If we are unsure how responsible another is – and how responsible they might be – this is a concern for theories requiring desert and proportionality in relation to desert as it might make setting proportionality difficult (See Brooks, Punishment 2d, 25-26).
B
Bad pub quiz, like a. A way of describing the Life in the UK test third edition. (See Brooks, The Trust Factor, 226).
Brexodus effect. The post-EU Referendum impact on individuals emigrating from the UK, especially in relation to the emigration of British citizens. (See Brooks, The Trust Factor, 17).
C
Children in need, case of. There are two children drowning in a pond. We are able to wade over to the children, but only have time to choose one child to rescue. (See Brooks, Global Justice, 47). See revised case of children in need and drowning child and the assassin.
Children in need, revised case of. There are two children asking for help. One child is drowning and the second child is completing homework. Only the second child is a co-national. We only have time to help one child. (See Brooks, Global Justice, 48).
Collectivity. The active collective life of a group. This might be expressed in multiple ways, such as the flourishing of shared languages and expressions or cultural traditions. (See Brooks, Global Justice, 23).
Consequentialist time-frames, problem of. Refers to problem that consequentialist theories justify themselves in reference to an expected outcome in future. While the expected outcome is usually specified, the time-frame for achieving it is not. Yet, if the outcome does not materialize, and if we do not know when in future it must do so, consequentialist claims are difficult to falsify as it can always be said the future for an outcome had not yet arrived. But, if relevant, would undermine a consequentialist theory qua theory if unfalsifiable. (See Brooks, Political Philosophy, forthcoming).
D
Difference (deterrence), problem of. Refers to the problem of different groups of people responding differently to one deterrent measure. The problem is that “a” deterrent policy could have multiple – even conflicting – impacts on different groups of people. (See Brooks, Punishment 2d, 50-51). See problem of domestic difference.
Distant drowning child. Suppose you are an astronaut exploring the moon in outer space. NASA contacts you to say there is a drowning child in a pond. As it happens, you can simply press a button inside your rocket sat on the moon and, if you do so, a dam will open that will lower the pond water so the child will be saved and be able to walk onto dry land. (See Brooks, Global Justice, 83).
Domestic difference (deterrence), problem of. Refers to the problem of different groups of people responding differently to one deterrent measure. The problem is that “a” deterrent policy could have multiple – even conflicting – impacts on different groups of people. (See Brooks, Punishment 2d, 50-51). See problem of difference.
Drowning child and the assassin. Imaginary example whereby you are pursued by an assassin. As you are chased, you see a drowning child as you approach the water’s edge. If we attempt to save the child, the assassin will catch us. (See Brooks, Global Justice, 83).
E
End-state solution. Refers to the idea that a solution can be conclusive (i.e., it cannot be undone). It is relevant to issues of climate change where the environment is changing regularly. (See Brooks, Climate Change Ethics for an Endangered World, 63-67; Brooks, Global Justice, 153).
Ethical landscape. The ethical boundaries around a community linked by shared normative bonds, including cultural, shared historical memories or religious. (See Brooks, Political Philosophy, forthcoming).
Evil nation. A nation that desires and attempts to create severe poverty elsewhere at every opportunity. (See Brooks, Global Justice, 93).
Exactness. The idea that equality means the precise same measure; equality as exact equivalency. (See Brooks, Political Philosophy, forthcoming).
F
Free movement myth. The claim that a citizen of any European Union country can travel free of any restrictions to any other European Union country at their own discretion. (See Brooks, Becoming British, 149).
Future condition. This relates to defining political alienation. It affirms that alienation must be a view of self-identity that is stable into the future, not a momentary feeling. (See Brooks, Political Philosophy, forthcoming).
G
Geography of crime. Refers to the place of crime. Its important is in recognising that crimes are not only things that happen outside courtrooms, jails or prisons. (See Brooks, Punishment 2d, 46.)
H
Hate crime offenders register. A register of individuals convicted of hate crimes barring them from working with children and vulnerable people. (See Brooks, The Trust Factor, 376).
I
Impermanent sustainability. Refers to thinking about environmental sustainability in an impermanent context of changing climatic conditions. (See Brooks, Climate Change Ethics for an Endangered World, 66-70; Brooks, Global Justice, 153).
Individualization, problem of. Refers to the issue of treating like cases alike in the criminal justice system by crime where there are differences in other contexts, such as treatment needs. Therefore, two individuals who’ve otherwise performed the same crime might be treated very differently if, on a rehabilitation theory view, one required more rehabilitation than another. (See Brooks, Punishment 2d, 68-69).
J
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K
King Alan’s court. Newcastle upon Tyne; refers to Alan Shearer and to Mark Twain’s A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur’s Court. (See Brooks, The Trust Factor, 384).
L
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M
Macrodeterrence. The deterrence of a group overall. Otherwise known as “general deterrence”. (See Brooks, Punishment 2d, 45).
Medicalization of crime. Refers to the emphasis of some of treating crimes like a sickness or disease that is capable of treatment. (See Brooks, Punishment 2d, 65).
Microdeterrence. The deterrence of an individual. Otherwise known as “specific deterrence”. (See Brooks, Punishment 2d, 45).
Multiple meanings, problem of. Refers to a problem with expressivist and communicative theories of punishment that aim to express or communicate “a” message. The problem is the same message may open up multiple meanings among a diverse audience – and so there may be many messages conveyed with multiple impacts. (See Brooks, Punishment 2d, 126).
N
Non-public reasons. Reasons that may be acceptable to one or more reasonable comprehensive doctrines, but not all and so cannot be a public reason. (See Brooks, “The Capabilities Approach and Political Liberalism” in (eds) Rawls’s Political Liberalism, 143).
O
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P
Penal borders. Refers to rating the seriousness of crimes. These borders can become blurred where different crimes are punished similarly. (See Brooks, Punishment 2d, 245.)
Penal pluralism. Refers to the use of two or more penal purposes in a coherent framework. (See Brooks, Punishment 2d, 143-144).
Punishing evil, problem of. Refers to view of some retributivists who argue evil should be punished in proportion to its wickedness. One issue is different people who have different views and so some way must be found to agree a common standard. But the problem is that, if not all crimes we want to punish are evil, evil cannot be the sole basis for deciding what should, or should not, be punished. (See Brooks, Punishment 2d, 22-23).
Punishment as response. Refers to punishment’s connectedness to crime, as a response to crime. Addresses concern that a theory of punishment must be consistent with a theory about crime. (See Brooks, Punishment 2d, 3).
Punitive restoration. Refers to a distinctive model of restorative justice that is (1) in the form of a restorative conference, (2) where offenders who admit guilt and apologise to victims are taken to have pleaded guilty, (3) where hard treatment is not ruled out if, and only if, it might enable restoration (e.g., intensive drug or alcohol treatment were required) and (4) where failure to satisfy a mutually agreed restorative contract in full could lead to prison with a suspended sentence having been imposed. (See Brooks, Punishment 2d, 167-169).
Q
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R
Random nation. An imaginary place where a group of individuals have in common only one thing: they were each randomly selected to live together in a shared place, spread out across a territory. (See Brooks, Global Justice, 23, 46).
Realistic optimism. A positive outlook rooted in pragmatic realism. (See Brooks, The Trust Factor, 112).
Rights-subject. Refers to the kinds of interests that justify protections as rights; these interests are the subject-matter of rights (or “rights-subject”). (See Brooks, Political Philosophy).
S
Stakeholder justice. Refers to the principle that those who have a stake should have a say. (See Brooks, “Ethical Citizenship and the Stakeholder Society”; Brooks, “The Stakeholder Society and the Politics of Hope”).
Substantive interest. Refers to the kind of interest relating to well-being that is required for justifying a right, on an interest theory of rights view. (See Brooks, Political Philosophy).
Systematic reading. Refers to a method for interpreting the philosophy of G W F Hegel, who wrote his work as a large, coherent system. The systematic reading attempts to understand Hegel’s contributions within the systematic context of his philosophy. This is relevant as the terminology, development of concept and argumentative structure is often imported from elsewhere in his system. (See Brooks, Hegel’s Political Philosophy 2d).
T
Terrorism. The deliberate threat or use of violence creating fear in order to achieve some outcome. (See Brooks, Global Justice, 119).
Time and changing effects, problem of. Refers to a problem for deterrence. There can be changing effects over time. Any deterrent theory must constantly reappraise its impact over time to account for time and changing effects. (See Brooks, Punishment 2d, 50).
Trust factor. Refers to the central importance of trust in politics. (See Brooks, The Trust Factor.)
U
Undeterrable, problem of. Refers to the challenge for deterrence theories where individuals are immune to deterrent measures. (See Brooks, Punishment 2d, 49).
Unified theory of punishment. Refers to a theory of punishment unifying multiple penal purposes of guilt, crime reduction, rehabilitation, restoration, expressivism and cost in lexical order from highest to lower priority within a coherent framework. (See Brooks, Punishment 2d, 159-160).
Unreformable, problem of. Refers to the challenge for rehabilitation theories where individuals are unable to be rehabilitated. (See Brooks, Punishment 2d, 71-72).
V
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X
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Y
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Z
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